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We have thus far endeavored to show eminent domain to be a
right, the quantity of that estate which the sovereign holds in the
property of the subject, and its constitutional modifications in this
country, if any such exist. We are next to consider, with whom
this power resides.
Eminent domain is said to be
"A.Rifft

tHoa

BELONGS TO TAE SOCIETY OP SOVEREWGN."'

In communities whith have not irrevocably, yielded all the powh
ers of the State to princes or hereditary rulers, this power will be
found subsisting in its natural state, in the people at large. Its exertion and all the concurring incidents of its exercise are to be
measured and restrained by their discretion only..- But as no community can long exist without recognizing some fundamental prin.
ciples of self-control, which shall regulate the otherwise impulsive
manifestations of popular will, it naturally follows, that even in the
IContinued from

vol. IV, p. 641,
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most ultra democracies, restraints and safeguards are involuntarily
thrown around the exercise of this right, which of all powers may
be made most intolerable to the governed, to prevent its oppression
of the subject. In our own country, the people in their original
omnipotent power, have wisely imposed on themselves the observance of those fundamental rules, whichto them seem the most likely to
insure the true end of government. They have endeavored to
fetter the attributes of sovereignty, so far only, as may prevent
their abuse and confine them within the limits of justice. They
have erected tie departments 6f government by which the process
of enacting, expounding, and enforcing the laws shall be carried on,
and as a necessary consequence, the powers without which it would
be impossible to effect the object the people hacl in view in establishing the government, ar6 retained by and become part of the power
of that department, which,.by its functions, is entitled to their exercise ; and though the people may modify o amend their constitutional restrictions, enlarging or diminishing the authority of their
instruments of government) yet whatever the functions retained by
those departments, if to any of them eminent domain is an essential,
a proportionate amount or extent will attach to and become a part
of those powers.
Previous to the formation of'te constitution of the United States
and those 6f the several States, this, together with the other attributes
of sovereignty vested in the people at large ;" but under our
present form of government, the eminent domain, within constitutional restrictions, rests with the legislatures of each State,' and,
so far as the functions of the general government may require it,
with Congress also. A it rests with these bodies, they of course
must be the judges of the proper occasion for its exercise, and it
must be, entrusted to their wisdom to determine when public uses or
necessities.require the assumption of private property 3 "As these
bodies most immediately emanate'from, and are nearest to, the general private interest it is a wise distribution of the functions of gov14 Wheat.

651; 8 Wheat. 584; 2 Peters' S. C. 656.
7 West. L. J. 260 ; g Paige, 74 ; 9 Barb. Sup. C. 850'.
*5 Hayw. 97 ; 18 Pick. 501.
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ernment, that a power so dangerous and easy of abuse, should be
reposed in those who from interest will jealously repel such abuse;
but if they should either wantonly, or in a mistaken view of their
own powers seize the goods of a citizen, it would be an assumption
of power the courts would not hesitate to pronounce unconstitutional
and void.'
It is said this right rests as a general rule with the legislatures of
the States,2 or the general government ; the exceptions are not such
strictly, but refer more particularly to those cases where the legislative-body, from an inability to determine accurately what the public interest certainly requires, have transferred their discretion to
subdivisions of the State authority, as to the collectors of taxes; or
to private enterprise, as private companies for public improvements.
Either of these latter, then, to an extent, exercises not only the
power of taking, but also of determining to a certain extent, what is
required. It may correctly be said that it is a parceling out to
sub-agents, a delegated authority.
Although the word sovereign is correctly applicable to a people
acting from the dictates of their own supreme will and accountable
to no one, yet we think Vattel had in view, in this use of it, a contradistinctive signification to the sense of the word "society," and
intended to designate those forms of government which are entirely
independent of popular will; or at most, remotely or indirectly
influenced by it; as in the limited monarchy of Great Britain,
in which the king and parliament are the supreme power of the
land, and necessarily with them in general rest the attribute, and
exercise of the right of eminent domain.' Yet it would seem for
some purposes, this power is among the rights of prerogative. The
king has the right without consulting parliament, to erect franchises
which in their nature must interfere with the claims of private persons, and this upon the writ of ad quod damnum, the name of which
12 Kent,

839.

22 Kent, 338-40; 7 Greenl. 292; 2 Porter, 296; 3 Paige, 45; 18 Wend. 9; Rice,

383.
34 Inst. 36; 1 Black. Com. 51.
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would tend to confirm the opinion; which writs running in the name of
the king were to inquire, "If it be to the damage or prejudice of us
or others; then to what damage and what prejudice of others."' The
same writ has also been made use of in this country.2 The crown
might of its own motion, on such writ, so determining the damages
which would accrue to itself or others, establish a ferry, market or
license the cutting of a canal through the lands of another, or the
taking of such species of property as may be necessary to the defence of the realm. 3 It has been usual however, in England, for
this right to be exercised under the sanction of an act of parliament,
particularly in the case of some new application of private property
to public uses, as in the early experiments and adoption of the railroad system in that country; but when experience has demonstrated
that the public interest can be subserved in an eminent degree by
such new application of private property, general acts have been
passed under which private capital and enterprise has been encouraged into investments beneficial to the public. Such is the Land
Clauses Consolidation Act of 8 Vict. c. 18, which provides that lands
may be taken under certain conditions and restrictions, and comprises in one general act sundry provisions usually introduced into acts
of parliament relative to the acquisition of lands required for under'takings of a public nature, for the purpose of avoiding repeated
legislation on similar subjects :4 most of the United States have
general enactments for the same purpose.
We have now said all we propose to do as to the particular
departments of government, in which this power resides, and we
come to an important division of our subject, if one part can be
said to be more so than another.
We have found the eminent domain of a State to consist in a
right which belongs to the society or the sovereign; we are now
to consider the manner in which that right may be properly mani2 9 Dana, 114.
'2 F. N. B. Ad quod Dam. 221.
32 Vin. Abr. 126; 10 Coke's R. 142: Cro. Chas. 266; 1 Black. Com., Chitty's
Ed. 139 n.
4 2 Chitty's Col. Stat. 807.
5 11 New Hamp. 19.
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fested; and this we deem finds an appropriate place under that
phrase of our definition which terms it

"A Bight of

DISPOSING."'

When it is determined that the welfare of the public for any
purpose whatever requires any property- in the. possession of the
subject to be surrendered to or disposed of by the State, there are
certain means by which the public good can be best subserved, and
conditions upon which only can the right be exerted.
As. the State in its national capacity cannot itself immediately
apply the thing taken to the intended use, it is necessary in this as
it is in all other manifestations of national will, that the purposes
of the sovereign be reached or effected through the instrumentality
of agents. 2 These may be either such as by their official connection
with the State are entitled to exercise a species of this right, as the
collector of the revenue, or rates, or corporations of individual
enterprise, by which latter it is supposed objects of. improvement
would be accomplished with more economy and less danger to the
community than if retained in the hands of the State.' The object
in delkgating the power is the public benefit to be derived from
tome contemplated undertaking, and the State'in consideration of
this, delegates its right to take, as regards a particular property,
sufficient to attain the desired improvement.4 All such persons,
therefore, enjoying or exercising any part of the right of eminent
domain so far represent, and are trustees for the public.' Such are
ferry, bridge, canal and railroad corporations, all of which, though
private corporations, are a public use.
The grants of this power are either express or implied.' Of the
first, an example is the charter to a bridge or railroad company
wherein the legislature or power authorized to confer this right, at
length set forth the causes which have moved them to the delegation
of authority to take property.. The second is ofan extraordinary
'John. Die., To dis.pose of; Web., Ibid.
2 8 Dana, 296; 8 Paige, 45; 9 Barb. Sup. C., 555.

s 3 Hill. S. Car. R., 105.
4 3 Paige, 74.
'7 West. L. J., 260; 11 N. H, 25; 18 Pick., 501.

6 25 Wend., 174.
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nature, and springs out 'f the immediate exigencies of particular
circumstances, as the right of the public to pass over adjoining
lands in avoiding a founderous highway, or destroying a less
valuable property to preserve that of greater value, or to preserve
life. In these latter cases, the maxim ",Salus yoyuli, suprema e8t
lex," has a most forcible application.
Of the construction of express grants, it will be impossiltle to say
more than we can do in a few lines, however much we might wish
to examine and profit by the able and elaborate discussions which
the subject has provoked. It has been among the most perplexing
questions ever brought into our courts,' though now it would seem
to be settled. Some courts have held, .and with great show of
plausible reasoning, that the grants of the public should receive the
same construction as the grants of individuals; while others have
as strenuously held, on the principle that if either party should be
benefited from the ambiguity of-a contract or allowed an advantage
from any uncertainty in it, it should rather be the public than the
individual, that public grants should be construed strictly. The
question has been decided variously in different courts, but the
settled principle of law is in favor of a strict construction.2
Such is the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States:
The measures necessary to transfer private property from the
individual to the public use, are matters of discretion with the
legislature, and are proviaed for.in the special -act or by some
general law; 3 this, however, will more aptly be considered under
the head of compensation. We, may say, in concluding this part
of our subject, that it is difficult to lay down any general rule that
would precisely define the power of government in the exercise of
the acknowledged, right of eminent domain. It must be large and
liberal, so -as to meet the public exigencies; and it mhst be so
limited and restrained as to secure effectually the rights of the
citizen. It must depend in some- measure upon the exigencies as
4
they arise and the circumstances of particular cases.
9 Geo., 524.
3 11 N. H., 19.

27 Pick., 434-8; 11 Peters' S. C., 420; 6 How., 796.
' 23 Pick., 394.
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There are,. however, two essential conditions or limitatIons to
the exercise of this right. One is the public welfare, which requires
the interest of the individual to yield to its paramount claims. The
other is the right to compensation which accrues to him from whom
the prope'rty is taken when transferred to the State.1 A provision
for the latter is a necessary attendant on the due and constitutional
exercise of the lawgiver to deprive an individual -of his property
without his consent, and is laid down by jurists as an acknowledged
principle of universal law.'
The right which belongs to the State, of seizing private property,
is, in definitions of it, placed upon the stringency of public necessity.
It would seem, in such definition, -asif the right of the State only
was in view, as in terms it has but the limitation of necessity, yet
all jurists acknowledge the moral obligation incurred by the State
to make compensation.
That princes did frequently seize the property of their subjects
under pretexts of public uses, history abundantly testifies. It was
in protection of the English people that the clause of the 29th
chapter of Magna Charta of Henry HI declared "That no man's
lands or goods should be seized into the king's hands against' the
great charter and the law of the land. ' 3 Magna Charta and its
confirmatory statutes are regarded as the basis of the English
constitution, and into them has been incorporated and from time t_time re-enacted and confirmed by her different sovereigns this
provision, making it a fundamental principle of the government; yet
the avarice of her rulers have been such that at different times the
safety and continuance of her constitution has been sadly endangered. One of the principal causes of complaint so late as the
third parliament of Charles I, was the exaction of money in the
form of forced loans and benevolences, which resulted in the petition
of right; but a repetition of which acts of tyranny cost him both his
throne and life.
So far as this extends, it serves to restrain oppressive exactions
by one department of the government, and to assure to the subject
'2 Par. Cont., 524; Grot., B. 3, ch. 19,
22 Kent., 339.

7; Puff., B. 8, eh. 5, 3, 7.
3 2 Inst., 45; 1 Blac. Com., 89.
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the right of being deprived of his property by due course of law;
but whenever the parliament of England by their statute seize upon
any private property to public uses, there is nothing more binding
upon them to compensate the owner than the moral obligation of
natural justice. They are so transcendent and absolute, that their
authority cannot be confined either for causes or persons within
any bounds;' but the natural equity of indemnity does in almost
every case prevail, and parliament rarely, if ever, and never
willingly, by this means inflicts an act of injustice, so much weight
has the principle of universal justice.2
In this country the rights of private property are guarded in the
securest manner. Our agents to whom are entrusted the exercise
of this power, are prohibited by provisions in the Constitution of
the United States which applies to all acts of the general government,3 and by provisions in almost all of the State constitutions,
4
from taking private property for public use without compensation.
Public necessity and compensation are indeed the vital principles
of this right, commensurate and co-existent with each other; and
there must be a conjunction of both to authorize its legitimate
exercise; and although some authorities seem to sanction the principle that the right of eminent domain may be exercised independent
of any provision for compensation, unless there is some other than
the mere moral obligation operating upon the State, 5 yet the
better opinion and weight of authority undoubtedly is, that even
where there are no constitutional restrictions to conditions of compensation, they are nevertheless as binding upon the State as though
they were declared by her constitution. 6 Indeed, viewing the matter
in the light of obvious justice, it is strange that it should ever have
been doubted, or that courts of justice should have promulgated a doctrine of such flagrant wrong-we had almost said iniquity. Its practical results would almost incline one to doubt the boasted unity of law
and reason. The doctrine must have originated in despotic governments, and in the infancy of those of more liberal principles, has
'4 Inst. 36.
'7 Peters, 243.
3 Dall. 245; Ib. 283.

2 Dall. 310; 7 Pet. 243; 8 Wend. 85.
4 14 Conn. 146; 8 Wend. 100.
6 2 Kent, 339, n.; 1 Maryland Ch., 252.
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een adopted into ad become a part of their polity; but this, like
,ther abuses of the law, founded in error and referred to as precelent, is now exploded, and it may be safely asserted that the universal principle acted upon by the courts of this country is, that
corpensatioa attaches to this right and is co-extensive with it, and
that even where there is no constitutional restriction of the right to
this condition, the principles of obvious justice would not permit the
subject to be deprived of his property without securing to him a
partial equivalent, for it must often happen that the possessions of
an individual may have to him a value entirely beyond its current
worth, as did the garden of Naboth, the "inheritance of his fathers."
We have been curious to trace the origin in our own courts of a
so manifestly erroneous doctrine, for in those of England the principle neither has, nor we will venture to say never will appear, and
we have found that the seizure of private property under such
circumstances has been confined to that of but trivial value; and in
the early establishment and declaration of the laws of such States
as have not constitutionally declared the principle of compensation.
In the early settlement of South Carolina, while the whole country
was as yet a wilderness, and roads and bridges were objects of the
greatest importance and eagerly desired by the citizens of every
part of the State, they were only too willing to have highways
constructed over their lands to facilitate mutual intercourse: the
materials too, which were commonly required for such purposes were
abundant and comparatively worthless, and it so happened that no
person ever required compensation, because every one was glad to
have a road run through his particular lands.' It had thus so
grown into a custom to require no compensation, that when the
custom was resisted and compensation claimed, the courts seemed to
have mistaken it for a true principle of law and to have strengthened
it by their confirmation, creating precedents by which subsequent
2
cases were decided.
But even while the courts acknowledged the obligation of pre3 lill Soll'h Car. 115.
I N.t t
' ,-or], 5, 387; 2 lb. 526; 4 Ib. 125; 3 Hill South Car. 107; 4
N.-C. 1.1. 54.
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cedent decisions, some of its members did not hesitate to question
the soundness of the principle, and declared that if such were the
rule of law in that State, it should be restricted to special cases,
and that the legislature could not delegate, by a general law, its
power of eminent domain, or taking property without compensation.,
It could not, however, be expected. that in an enlightened age,
much as precedent might be deferred to, that a rule of such manifest
injustice should continue to be recognized; the doctrine was accordingly violently questioned in a most elaborate and learned opinion
by one of the justices of that State, the effect of which so awakened
public consideration to the subject that the legislature by a subsequent general act required compensation for any property taken
for public purposes. "A fine instance,"
say the court, "of the
'
advancement of moral influences.
Such is a brief history of a most novel and extraordinary doctrine
-one which is in its nature so inconsistent with ourenotions of
republican principles, where the rights of all are equally secured,
that it excites our surprise that it should ever have obtained judicial
countenance in this country.
Property is most usually taken under special statutes, and our constitutions~recognize the right of eminent domain on which these statutes
are founded, but they intend to protect carefully.individual property,
and their language is generally, that private property shall not be
taken for public use, without "just compensation."
The theory being that the individual from whom property is taken,
is entitled to just compensation therefor, and this term being incorporated into most of our State Constitutions, in express terms, it
becomes an interesting inquiry to ascertain what the phrase, "just
compensation," may comprehend.
Acting upon the principle that a spirit of justice and equity
required that an individual shall not receive a benefit witliout incurring a commensurate obligation to those from whom it is obtained,
some courts have held that in the estimate of damages or compensation, whatever benefits have accrued to the owner of property in
the enhancement of his remaining property by the disposition of a
28 Hill South Car. 109.
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part of it to public pfirposes, such benefits should be made to offset
the claim to compensation,' and it was ironically remarked by a
certain judge that "it was a remarkable feature of such estimates,
that the measure of the increased value of the enhanced property
is the exact measure of the cost of the property taken."
But it has been replied that the constitutional obligation to make
compensation, did not contemplate the equities of the transaction
as regarded benefits, but regarded absolute compensation, and that
when property of a particular value is taken from the owner,
nothing but that value in money can satisfy constitutional obligations, for if he from whom part of his property is taken, is remunerated in part or in whole, so also is the property of others enhanced
in value, perhaps as much or more than his own, and it would be
unfair to require him to pay for an advantage towards which they
contributed nothing. 2
The latter seems to be the general rule, and we understand the
term, just compensation to signify the dry claim to the value, in
money, of the thing taken, at the time of the taking, irrespective of
any speculative advantages or disadvantages whatever.S
Although the principle that when property is taken for the public
use, compensation must be made, it is often a most difficult practical
question to determine when there has been such a divestiture of
property as demands compensation. The different degrees in which
property may be affected, to the owner's disadvantage, and by
means, more or less indirect, are almost infinite, and it becomes
almost impossible to lay down any general rule applicable to the
facts of every case; some have contended that the taking or appropriation measuring the compensation to be made, is to be confined
only to the actual value of the property taken, and whatever might
be the injury indirectly resulting to the owner from a disposal of it
to the use of the public, that he has no claim to consequential injuries,
unless some special provision is made in his favor, and the authori123 Vt. 361; 3 Watts. 29-3; "6 Blackf. 384; 8 Wend. 10] ; 9 Leigh, 325;
14 Ohio, 541; 16 Penn. S. R. 191.
22 Kent, 340. ;;. : 5 Dan.. 28: QGeo. 3134; 7 Dana, 813; 9 Dana, 114; fBarb. S.
C. 21';: S. C. " Flarb. S. C. .335.
3Sedgwick Meas. Dam. 5G6.
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ties for this view of the question are formidable ;I but the more
equitable rule and the one certainly maintainable upon principle is,
that consequential as well as direct 'injuries, should be included in
the estimate, and that it must be left in a great- measure to, the
integrity and sense of justice of those to whom is confided the consideration of the rights of both parties, in other words, to juries or
commissioners. 2
This rule will, we think, commend itself to the understanding of
all. Legislative acts may be procured affecting and interfering more
or less directly with vested rights: as for instance, one corporation
may be chartered with powers that infringe privileges already conferred on a preceding corporation. If there is nothing in the
charter of the first inhibiting legislative interference with its privileges in an indirect or consequential manner, it is olear the franchise
of the first may be destroyed without compensation, for- it is a legal
damnun absque injuria.;3 but if such provisions exist, or if the
rights under the first be directly infringed, the amount of damages must
correspond to, and be measured by the extent of the injury, either
direct or consequential. Thus in the Charles River and Warren
Bridge case, there were no expressed terms of exclusive limits, or
stipulation not to charter a second company with powers. to interfere with those of the first, and the court in effect, held this to be a
loss without injury; but had exclusive limits beeni assigned, there
would have been no question as to the measure of compensation
being the value of the franchise jossessed by the Charles River
Bridge Company', at the time of its seiz'ure. 4 In every case, we
think the principle may be maintained, that it is for the tribunal
put in possession of the. facts of each particular case, to determine
the extent of the injury and corresponding damage; they must be
the judges, and determine for themselves their own application of
the maxim ceaua proxima, non remota spectatur. If a franchise or
privilege .may continue to exist, having been shorn of only an
11 Dall. 357; 7 Greenl. 273; 4 Dana, 154; 6Whar. 25; 6 W. & S. 101 - 8 W. &
S. 85; 6 Penn. S. R. 879; 6 Barb. S. C. 209.
22 John. Ch. 162; 2 Kent, 340, n. ; 11 Peters, 688; 4 Vomst. 195.
8 11 Peters, 420; Story, J., dissentient, 688 ; 21 Vermont, 590.
4 6 Amer. Law Mag. 307; 8 Hill N. Y. 170.
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incident of its being, 'or if there has been no substantial interference
with its rights, but only a seizure of some part of its property, the
loss of which will not essentially interfere vith the purposes of its
existence; for such loss it can only claim a money value, and will
not be allowed to force attention to its so claimed impaired privileges when such privileges remain entire *; but if in giving effect to
the legislative intention, the consequences of which a jury or those
designated by the State to adjust the rights of the respective
parties, shall determine to be a practical destruction of a previously
conferred franchise, there can be no doubt of the obligation to make
compensation to the extent of the full value of such franchise so
seized.2
There are, indeed, many cases of this description where consequential damages are to be taken into consideration: as if the
injury result from the creation of a new and rival franchise in a
case required by public necessity.3
Much discussion also has arisen as to whether the compensation in these cases is to be made concurrently with taking property,
or what results are to follow where a concurrent remedy is not pro4
vided in the act authorizing property to be taken.
In regard to the constitutional provision securing trial by jury,
it has been decided, in New York, that a legislative enactment for
the ascertainment of damages by a committee is not unconstitutional.5
So in regard to the final decision of the County Court in Yermont. 6
There have been very diverse views, as above stated, relative to
the time when compensation must be made. In New York, it is
well settled, that where an act authorizing the taking of private
property for public uses provides for just compensation to the
owner, it is sufficient that the act makes provision for future compensation.7
The assessment and payment of damages need not precede the
entry and occupation. The rules, however, are different in different
States.8 Chancellor Kent holds, however, that compensation, or
27 New Hamp. 85, 70; 8 1b. 898; 10Ib. 188; 11Ib. 19,
128 Pick. 891.
3 1 Bald. C. C. 205; 11 Peters, 638; 2 John. Ch. 162; 2 Kent, 199.
4 Sedg. M. Dam. 556.
6 8 Paige, 45.
7 7 Barb. 8, 0. 416 j 1 Penn. 809,
6 19 Vt. 479; 8 Humph. 476.
8 2 W. & S. 320; 3 How. Mis. 62,
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offer of it, must precede or be concurrent with the seizure and entry
upon private property under the authority of the State. The settled and fundamental interpretation of the constitutions of some of
the States in relation to taking property upon compensation is, that
government has no right to take private property without just compensation ; and it seems to be implied that the indemnity should,
in cases which will admit of it, be previously and equitably ascertained, and ready for reception concurrently in point of time with
the actual exercise of the right of eminent domain.1
In England, by the Land Clauses Consolidation Act,, compensation is given for any lands, or "any interest therein, which shall
have been taken for, or injuriously affected by the execution of the
work ;" and under this statute, damage done by dirt and dust, and
the obstruction of customers, is a subject of remuneration.8 Under
this statute, also, the damages must be paid before entry.4 Where
a dock company authorized to take lands, were to make compensation for the damages occasioned to any such land by the execution of the works, it was held that this language would induce compensation to a land-owner palring with his premises, for loss he
would sustain by having to give up his business as a brewer, until
he could obtain other suitable premises for carrying it on.5
In deficiency of any adjudication, Ithe point as to how far persons
are liable as trespassers who act under a statute authorizing the
seizure of property to the public use, but which does not provide
compensation, Chancellor Kent thinks the more reasonable and
practicable construction to be that the statute would be primafacie
good and binding, and sufficient to justify acts done under it, until
a party was restrained by judicial process. 6
The means by which the compensation for property taken is to
be determined are, in England, either by a writ of ad quod damnum,
-or by commissioners appointed by the court for that purpose.
The
first is, perhaps, peculiar to grants from the crown, though such
things as-parliamentary writs of ad quod damnum are mentioned
2 Kent, 339, n.; Code Napoleon, Art. 545.
15 Jur. 261.
9 Q. B. 443.

2 8 Vic. 0. 18.

4 1 Excheq 723.
6 2 Kent, 339, n.
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in some of the books-. It is most usual, however, both in England
and in this country, to appoint commissioners whose duty it is to
determine the injury and assess the damages. Here, the State
is bound to provide some tribunal for the assessment of compenisation or indemnity, before which both parties may meet and discuss their claims on equal terms. 2 In some of the States the writ
of ad quod damnum has been used, but it is more usual, as in
England, to appoint special commissioners, 3 whose duties are performed when they have examined the quality and value of the pro4
perty taken, and filed their report.
Having, at as much length as our limits will permit, stated the
leading principles of law relative to compensation, we will now
briefly consider that class of cases in which private property may be
injured by, or taken for the use of the public, in a manner for which
there is not, unless the common law has been amended by statute,
any compensation allowed. They arise out of the urgent necessity
of the occasion, and are unavoidable in their nature, and have
obtained on the principle that it is better to suffer a private mischief than a public inconvenience; and this is the law of urgent
necessity.
Of this principle there are many striking illustrations. If a road
be out of repair, a passenger may lawfully go through a private
enclosure.5 So, if a man is assaulted, he may fly through another's
7
close.6 In time of war bulwarks may be built on private ground.
Thus, also, every man may of common right justify the going of
his servants or horses on the banks of navigable rivers for towing
barges, &c., to whomsoever the right of soil belongs. s Thi pursuit
of foxes through another's ground is allowed, because the destruction of such animals is for the public good.' And as the safety of
I 1 Burrows,

464.

2 2 John. Ch. 162; 5 Miller, 416; 1 Bald. 222.
3 8 Dana, 298; 3 Paige, 76; 8 Wend. 102; 2 Jour. P. C.521 ; 8 Hump. 476.
5 2 Black. Com. 36.
4 1 Penn. S. R. 132.
6 5 Bac. Abr. 173.
7 Dyer, 8; Brook, Tresp. 213; 5 Bac. Abr. 175.
9 2 Buls. 62; Cro. 1, 321.
3 1 Ld. Raymond, 725.
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the people is a law above all others, it is lawful to part affrayers in
the house of another man.' Houses may be razed to prevent the
spreading of a conflagration, and many other instances might be
icited illustrative of the law of necessity.1
In the civil law the reason assigned why no compensation was
allowed in cases of destruction by public enemies was, that every
man might be made more diligently to guard his ownc1
But, although by the common law there accrues no tight of action
to the party whose property is injured in the preservation of life or
more valuable property, or in cases of injury to property from
unavoidable necessity, yet in some of the States, by statute, as
before suggested, the loss thus sustained for the good of the community is assessed upon those who have been most immediately
benefited by the destruction. Thus, incases of houses or buildings
necessarily torn down, or otherwise destroyed, to prevent the spread
of conflagration, it is allowed to assess the loss upon the city;' tut
this does not extend to the case of property destroyed which would
have been consumed had it not been so destroyed.5
There are also injuries so remote from the act committed, that
the law will not allow actual compensation,'presuming the injured
party is compensated by sharing in the advantages arising from the
original act,6 such as the police regulation of cities for the safety
or health of its citizens: the principle being that all property is
acquired and held under the tacit consideration that it shall not be
so used as to injure the equal rights of others, or destroy or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community; or, as the
7
inaxim expresses it, 8ic atere tuo t,alieftton leda8.
So far) we have discussed the nature of the interest existing in
the State, in virtue of the right of eminent domain; considered to
9 Puff, b. 2, oh. 6, - 85. 1 Dall. 862,
'20 Vin. Abr. f. 407.
1 Grot. B. , cb. 20, 8 20 Tin.Abr.fE 20.
4 25 Wend. 174; 18 Wend. 126.
b 2 Denio, 473; 8 Met. 462;. 17 Wend, 295.
%13 Barb. S. C. 36; 4 T. R. 494; 2 T. R. 368; 8 Dina, 301
v Puff. b. 8, ch. 5, J 85 WiUes, 388 ; Vattel, b. 1, ch 20, J 246 ; 7 Cow. 585; 2
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whom it belongs ; where it rests ; and the manner of its exertion;
observing the condition of compensation which has last engaged our
attention.
We are now to consider the second indispensable condition, upon
which only, can private right be made subservient to the interest of
the public, and property be seized to its use; and this, in the words
of our lefinition of eminent domain, is
" IN CASE OF NECESSITY AND FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY."

The sense in which Vattel here uses the word "necessity," we
have supposed to correspond to our idea of the ordinary requirements of a State, in the promotion of trade, commerce and improvements' of various kinds, facilitating intercourse among its own
citizens, and those of other nations, rather than those extraordinary
occasions arising out of an overwhelming necessity, where the safety
of an individual, a community, or a nation demand the sacrifice of
private property.
We will consider, then, first, that class of cases which may be
termed of ordinary necessity.
The necessities of the State as used in. this sense, are of frequent
occurrence, particularly in well-regulated and enterprising communities, where trade and commerce are in the most flourishing condition; railroads, canals and highways of every description, are
demanded to facilitate internal communication, private lands may
be desirable for the health and recreation of the inhabitants of
cities ; streets may be found too narrow and confined for public
convenience; in a fhousand ways can the public be benefited by
the assumption of private property, and in such cases it is in conformity with the most rational principles of natural justice that the
interest of the individual should yield to the advantage of the
many.
As the rigit rests with the sovereign, so must the sovereign wisdoni be the only criterion by which the wants of the public can be
mcasured: and the right is co-extensive with the public wants and
21
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has no other limit

;i

but as necessity is the essence f the claim upon

which that right is to be asserted, if the delegated agents of the
sovereign, be they legislative bodies or third persons, to whom such
bodies have entrusted a special discretion, should in any manner
interfere with the security of private property, under a pretext of
public use or service, it would be an outrage and violation of private right which the courts of justice would not tolerate. 2 - Neither
upon full compensation does the right of eminent domain imply an
authority to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to
another, for the public interest would in no way be benefited or
promoted by such transfer.' If, however, the public interest can in
any manner be encouraged or advanced, it must rest in the wisdoiA
of the legislature to determine whether the proposed benefit to the
public is of sufficient importance to warrant an equitable interference with the private rights of the individual.' But it is said that
it is not the lowest degree of public necessity which ill justify the
exercise of this right. As to precisely what the public welfare requires, it is often a matter of doubt and controversy among those
equally wise in questions of State; but the question once settled,
we know of no limit to the right of eminent domain.
In practice, these matters should always be considered with referenie to the wants of the public as being of greater or less importance, according to the nature of the property to be taken, as
being of greater or less value.
The extraordinarynecessities of a State, are those to which we
have understood Yattel to refer, when he Apetks of " public safety;"
and we shall be doing little more than repeating what we have
before said when discussing the subject of compensation.
The necessities for the preservation of its very existence, which
a State may be often placed under, give it naturally the very
strongest.claim to whatever may in the remotest manner be of service to it ; of this class is the right to enter upofn the lands of the
citizen for the purpose of erecting national defences, the seizing on
property, money, or material of whatever kind which may be useful
17
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in withstanding or expelling an enemy, the conscription of soldiers
or the impressment of sailors. These cases of extreme necessity are,
in their imperative nature, similar to that class in which only an
individual may be the party to whom accrues the paramount right
of unavoidable necessity; indeed, the right is the same whether it
be employed for the benefit of an individualor a nation : inexorable
necessity is its origin-its measure and limit-and this right must
be equal to the exigencies of each particular case.
Having thus far, in the words of our definition of the right of
eminent domain, found it to be "A right which belongs to the
societg or the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity and for
the public safety,"-continuing the words of that definition, our
author tells us that it embraces within its comprehensive claims,
"ALL THE WEALTH CONTAINED IN THE STATE."

It is unnecessary for us to say that this part of our definition needs
no comment that it has not already received in the preceding pages ;
the difficulty in a practical application of the principles of eminent
domain, lying, not in determining what wealth or property is subjected or exempted from the paramount claim of the State, but in
a proper compliance with the legal restrictions and protections under
which it may be appropriated to public use.'

In taking leave of our subject, the investigation of which has
given us a pleasure, while we hope it has not been without a measure of instruction, we cannot close without expressing our admiration for the singular aptness of its rules, for establishing the
welfare of society, and promoting the happiness of the subject ;and how, in our own country, the development of its principles,
directed by institutions novel in the history of nations, has only
tended to confirm the wisdom in which they were conceived, and
the caution with which they have been expounded. If the harmo17
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